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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ALVIN C. SPACKMAN,
R-esponden·t,
'VS.

ALTON J. CARSON,
Appella1~t

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In this action the plaintiff-respondent sued to recover damages claimed to have been suffered in a motor
vehicle accident as the result of defendant's alleged
negligent operation of his truck. Defendant's answer
denied any negligence on his part, and alleged contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in failing
to keep a lookout for defendant. (R. 5-6.) The defendant
appeals from a judgment on the jury's verdict for plaintiff.
The only question presented by this. appeal is
whether the court below erred in denying defendant's
motion for a directed verdict which was made on the
grounds that there was no evidence of defendant's negligence and that the evidence showed without dispute that
defendant was guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law in the particulars alleged ( R. 290).
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The ac.cident happened on 25 October, 1947, at about
3 :45 p. m. on U. S. Highway No. 91 at a point about 1.2
miles south of the City of Richmond. The road there
runs in a straight line approximately in a north and
south direction for at least a mile past the defendant's
home, which is located just east of the highway opposite
the point of the accident. The weather was clear, the
sun was shining, and plaintiff had an unobstructed view
of the .highway for at least one-half mile as he approached f"rom the south on his motorcycle. (See Record
1, 5, 85, 86, and 146).
It is undisputed that immediately preceding the
accident the defendant's truck and automobile were
parked in front of his home, headed north on the east
side of, and from four to nine feet from, the paved
and traveled portion of the highway. The truck was
about 18 inches behind the passenger car. (R. 88-9, 147,
200-203, and Defendant's Exhibit No. 1, R. 237.)
The only witness of the actual collision were plaintiff and defendant.
The plaintiff testified that he was driving his
motorcycle north on the right hand side of the highway.
When he first saw the truck it was parked in the position
described. At that time he was ''some distance'' south
of the truck (R. '88, 96). He estimated the distanc.e as
"-about 200 feet. That is about, not exact." (R. 146.)
Mter he came around the turn about a half-mile south
there was nothing between him and the truck to obstruct
his view (R. 146).
2
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.The plaintiff ne:rt san' the truck ~ohen he was about
30 feet from the point of the accideHt. At that time,
according to his testimony, the truck had moved out
onto the east portion of the high,Yay, 'vith the left front
w·heel about 11h feet east of the centerline and the rear
end of the truck still slightly off the pavement. He did
not see it at any time bet~veen the time of his first view
of the parked vehicle and the time when it wa,s on the
road immediately in front of him and moving about 10
miles per hour, according to his estimate. (R. 89, 91, 96,
154 and 163). It was then too late to avoid a collision.
The uncontradicted testimony of the defendant is
well illustrated by Defendant's Exhibit No. 1, which
was admitted for that purpose. He testified that his
purpose was to haul some old cans to the river. His
intended course lay directly north on U. S. 91 for about
a large city block· and then west. He had parked the
truck behind his passenger car only ten or fifteen
minutes before, and had loaded the cans. He came
from the house, walked in front of his truck, between
it and the car, and then back (south) along the truck
to the cab. There was then nothing on the highway south
of him. He entered the cab, started the motor, and
backed up 12 or 15 feet to get space to clear the car.
He applied his brakes to stop. This lighted his red
stop-light on the left rear of the car. He then looked
in the rear view mirror. There was nothing· in sight.
Thereupon he shifted into first gear (the truck has four
speeds forward), made an arm signal and drove slowly
northward almost parallel with the highway but gradually angling out to the left onto the east portion of the
pavement. He shifted into second gear. His two left
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wheels were on the pavement, the left front wheel about
two feet from the centerline. Both right wheels were still
off the pavement. The defendant then saw a red flash
in the rear view mirror, followed by a red flash beside
him. There was a crash and the noise of the motorcycle engine roaring. The defendant's truck made a
sharp turn to the right, and traveled twelve feet to a
point off the highway, where defendant brought it to a
stop. Defendant got out. The plaintiff was beside the
road, and the motorcycle, with engine running wild, was
in the west half of the road. He examined the plaintiff,
decided he was too badly injured to be~ moved by him,
shut off the engine and summoned aid. (R. 210-222).
There is no contradiction of any of this evidence,
with the minor exception that the plaintiff indicated
that defendant's truck was at a sharper angle to the
line of the highway when plaintiff saw it the second time
in the moment just before the impact. This is probably
immaterial, but we doub~ that any reasonable mind could
believe, in the light of the physical evidence, that plaintiff had received a correct impression of this point. The
nature of the damage to the running board (Defendant's
Exhibit No. 2) and the front axle (Defendant's Exhibit
No. 3) of the truck clearly shows that the force of the
blow which bent them came from the rear toward the
front, instead of from the side. Moreover, it is uncontradicted that in the collision the left rear clearance reflector and the front running or ''courtesy'' light on the
left of the truck, were stripped off, and the tie-hooks
underneath the left of the truck body were bent forward. ( R. 223).
4
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The fact remains that plaintiff, who could have
seen (f he ha-d lookt:d, did not see the truck back up,
did not see its stop lights illuminated, did not see it
stop, and did not see it move forw·ard and to the left
onto the high,Yny, although he knew the truck was there.
As he did not look at the truck he did not and could not
attempt to controvert the defendant's testimony, and
there is no eYidence in the record, anywhere, that the
defendant ""'as negligent in any of the particulars alleged
in the complaint. The plaintiff merely testified, in effect, that he saw the truck parked, and when he looked
again it 'vas in front of him o:p. the highway.
When both parties had rested the defendant moved
the court for a directed verdict for defendant of ''no
cause for action'' upon the grounds that there was no
evidence of negligence by defendant and that the evidence
showed without conflict that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in failing to keep a reasonable and
prudent lookout for other vehicles. The court, by Judge
1\rlorrison, who presided, denied the motion (R. 290) and
submitted the case to the jury, which brought in a verdict for plaintiff, and judgment was entered thereon.
Defendant duly and regularly gave notice and moved
for a new trial, assigning insufficien-cy of the evidence
to support the verdict. Upon denial of this motion this
appeal was taken.
STATEMENT OF ERROR
Appellant relies upon the following error committed
by the trial court for a reversal of the judgment of the
court below :
5
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1. The trial court erred in denying defendant's
motion for a directed verdict in favor of defendant upon
the issues on plaintiff's complaint: "No Cause for
Action.''
ARGUMENT
As we view this case, only two points need be discussed:
F·i,rst: There is no evidence that the defendant was
negligent.
Second: The evidence shows without dispute, and
on plaintiff's own testimony, that the proximate cause
of the accident was the negligence of the defendant in
failing to keep a lookout for defendant's truck and to
act properly in accord with the knowledge this would
have brought him.

I. There is no evidence that defendant was negligent.

Little need be said on this point. It is self evident
upon an inspection of the record. Defendant's truck
was parked on the untraveled portion of the highway,
where it had a right to be. Plaintiff saw it there as he
approached from the south. The next time he saw it
it was partly on the east ha1f of the highway, as it had
a right to be.
The only evidence as to how the truck proceeded
from the first to the second position is that of the de6
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fendant, and it shows that he proceeded cautiously and
carefully in all respects. The plaintiff admitted that
he didn't see the maneuver--he didn't see the truck at
all bet,,·een the first and second positions. The allegation of the complaint that defendant drove suddenly
and without any signal into plaintiff's path when plaintiff was only thirty ( 30) feet distant is absolutely unsupported. On the contrary, when plaintiff looked up
\vhen thirty (30) feet a'vay the truck was already in
the east lane of the highway, according to plaintiff's
own testimony.
The testimony of the plaintiff fails to show any
negligence, while that of the defendant, showing the
exercise of reasonable care, stands uncontradicted. It
is obvious that plaintiff was ''woolgathering'' while the
defendant was carefully driving his truck out onto the
highway.
We submit that the motion for a directed verdict
s~ould have been granted on this ground.

II. The evidence shows 'Without dispute, and on plaintiff's own testi1nony, that the negligence of plaintiff w·as
a proximate cause of the accident.
It is apparent from all the circumstances in this
case, as well as from the plaintiff's own sworn testimony,
that the plaintiff just did not look at what was happening on the highway immediately in front of him, or that
if he did look it was so inattentively that he failed to
perceive the developing situation w_hich so obviously
and so vi tally affected his own safety.
7
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The def en dan t 's truck did not ' 'rna terialize'' out of
nothing, like the ectoplasm of the spiritualists, in the
pathway of plaintiff's motorcycle. It backed up twelve
or fifteen feet, turned on its stop light, turned off the
light, and drove diagonally forward onto the road, all
in plain sight of the plaintiff on a bright, clear day.
The plaintiff had already seen the truck: he knew it was
there before him on the highway, and that he was approaching it at a speed of about forty-five miles per
hour. And yet he swore he did not see any of these
movements: he did not see the truck at all between the
time of his first view of the parked vehicle and the time
he saw it right in front of him on the highway. (R. 154)
He did not slow down, he did not sound a horn, he did
not give way to the left. In fact the plaintiff did nothing
to indicate that he had seen that he was riding into danger. Clearly, he told the truth: he did not even see the
obvious movements of the truck, fraught with significance as they were. Where he was looking it does not
appear, but the ineseapable conslusion is that he was
not looking before him on the highway down which he
was riding at forty-five miles per hour. If he had
looked he would have seen the truck's movements; if he
had seen the truck's movements he would have taken
some action to avoid a collision . He would have sounded
his horn, slowed down, or turned to pass on the left of
the truck, where on his own story there \vas ample
room.
The simple question here is whether the plaintiff
was, as a matter of la,v, contributorily negligent in failing to keep even the casual look-out before him which
would have disclosed the movement of the truck into his
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path in ample time to aYoid a collision. W f:\ submit the
proper an~\Yer is in the affirmative.

In fart this court has, we submit, already decided
this question of la"'" in the 'Yay we suggest by its opinion
in the recent case of
Conklin YS. Walsh
193 Pac. 2nd 437 (Utah, 1948).
The facts of that case and the one at bar are
strikingly similar. In that case this Court held that a
driver of a vehicle on an arterial highway was contributorily negligent as a matter of law where, while 200 feet
back, he observed a vehicle approaching on his left and
then failed to observe the approaching vehicle again until
it was too late to avoid the collision. The fact that the
approaching vehicle had to stop for a stop sign was
deemed insufficient to excuse the failure of the driver
of the vehicle on the arterial highway to keep a proper
lookout. In Conklin v. Walsh the approaching vehicle
was visible to the favored driver for a distance of between 63 and 77 feet. In the instant case the defendant's truck was visible for a half mile and admittedly at
least two hundred feet. Both the approaching vehicle
in Conklin v. Walsh and the defendant's truck in the
instant case were in motion while in plain view of the
other vehicle. In both cases, the driver on the arterial
highway saw the other vehicle while back about two
hundred feet from the point of impact and in both
cases the driver- on the arterial highway failed to look
again at the other vehicle until too late to avoid the collision. In the case of Conklin v. Walsh the driver .on
9
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the arterial high,vay attempted to excuse his failure to
look on two grounds (a) he was protected by the stop
sign and (b) he was looking at traffic that might be
coming from the south. Both of these excuses V\ ere
deemed insufficient by this Court. In the instant case
no excuse was given by the plaintiff as to why he traveled
170 feet after seeing the defendant's truck right in
front of him without making any further observation of
the truck and its movements until it 'vas too late to
avoid the impact. Furthermore, in the instant case the
truck was right in front of the plaintiff while in the
Conklin v. Walsh case the approaching vehicle was
coming from the left and was not as easily observed as
defendant's truck. We feel that if anything the instant
case is even stronger on its facts than Conklin v. Walsh,
and that the trial court erred in failing to rule as a
matter of law that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which would bar his recovery.
The case of
7

Mingus v. Olsson,
201 Pac. 2nd 495 (Utah, 1949)
is also in point. There this court held that a pedestrian
who proceeded onto a crosswalk, where he had the right
of way, wa.s, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory
negligence in failing to look for and see an approaching
automobile. As the court there said,
''The duty to look has inherent in it the
duty to see what is there to he seen, and to pay
heed to it. "
In the case at bar it is clear that the plaintiff had a
10
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duty to look, in \\?hich "·as inherent the duty to see the
defendant's truck as it backed and then moved forward,
and the further duty to pay heed by taking appropriate
and easily available action to ""'arn defendant and to
avoid a collision. He discharged none of these duties,
but drove blindly on until the truck loomed up before
him only thirty feet a\Yay. The failure to discharge
these duties is contributory negligence as a rna tter of
law.

See also Hickok Y. Skinner
190 Pac. 2nd 514 (Utah, 1948).
It seems clear that u~der a correct application of
the law to the uncontroverted facts in this case the defendant-appellant was not guilty of_ any negligence, but
even if he were, the plaintiff-respondent was himself
guilty of contributory negligence, barring recovery, as a
matter of l:ttw.
The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion
for a directed verdict. The judgment of the. court below should be reversed and the court instructed to enter
judgment for defendant.
Respectfully submitted,

BULLEN & BELL,
THATCHER & YOUNG
Attorneys for Appellant.
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